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Administrative Law:
The Importance of Regional Administration to Federalism
Dave Owen1
Federalism generates many of the seminal debates of American
politics and law. Two recurrent premises underlie these debates: first,
that federal governance means centralized governance, and, second,
that decentralization means empowering state or local governments.
From those premises flows a series of plusses and minuses of federal
power. On the plus side, the federal government can minimize
interstate externalities, establish nationally consistent regulatory
programs, and draw on greater expertise and institutional economies
of scale. On the minus side, the federal government is less likely to
take innovative approaches or understand or respond to local
conditions, while states and municipalities are the classic
“laboratories of democracy” where experimentation reigns and local
preferences receive more nuanced understanding and response.
This conventional wisdom is undermined by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers’s implementation of section 404 of the Clean
Water Act, which regulates the filling of “waters of the United
States.”2 An investigation of the 404 program leads to several key
conclusions. First, it demonstrates that federal governance
sometimes is quite decentralized. Second, it shows that regional
federal offices can provide many of the benefits—and some of the
problems—that federalism rhetoric traditionally associates with state
and local governments. Third, it shows that regional federal offices
often interact symbiotically with states, thus helping our federalist
system succeed. Fourth, and finally, it reveals the need for more
inquiry into the intersections between regional offices and
administrative law.
The Structure and Approach of the Army Corps
The Army Corps’s regulatory branch holds primary
responsibility for implementing section 404 of the Clean Water Act.

1. Summarized and excerpted from Dave Owen, Regional Federal
Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58 (2016).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
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Other than the roughly eight Corps regulatory staff members who
work full-time in Washington, D.C., regulatory-program staff
members are dispersed among eight division offices, thirty-eight
“district” offices, and many field offices across the country. Some of
those field offices are heavily staffed, while other offices are simply
individual employees working out of their homes. Decisions about
office placement are themselves partly decentralized. Subject to the
D.C. office’s budgetary control, district commanders may choose
whether and where to open field offices and how to staff them.
This geographic dispersion affects agency operations in several
ways, one of which is to facilitate decentralization of
communications and professional relationships. State agency
partners, for example, will generally work with Corps offices in, or at
least close to, their own state. Similarly, people seeking (or
opposing) permits from the Corps will generally work with a Corps
office close to their activities. Often, they will be talking to a Corps
staffer who has worked for years in that particular geographic area.
Those geographic connections and familiarities lead to close
understanding of local culture and priorities and to an empathy for
the people and their concerns. According to one district chief, this
continuity of closeness could lead to more sensitivity to local needs
than comparable state bureaucracies.
This geographic dispersion of staff and authority has
consequences for both the objects and beneficiaries of the Corps’s
regulatory program. The agency routinely adjusts its regulatory
program to local conditions, much like a judge applying national law
to a geographically distinct set of facts. And it also adjusts the law
itself by allowing, and sometimes encouraging, regional variation in
regulatory approaches.
For example, the Corps takes a region-influenced approach to
deciding which aquatic features are subject to federal regulatory
oversight. It has developed, upon a recommendation from the
National Academy of Sciences, regional supplements to the national
wetland delineation handbook. The supplements do not change the
law but instead allow the Corps to apply a consistent set of principles
to distinctive regional facts.3

3. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, REGIONAL SUPPLEMENT TO
THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS WETLAND DELINEATION MANUAL: ATLANTIC
AND GULF COASTAL PLAIN REGION (VERSION 2.0) 1 (2010).
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The Army Corps also makes regional adjustments to the tens of
thousands of permits it issues each year. Tailoring occurs with all
permits, but the most readily apparent example involves general
permits, which established standardized permitting requirements for
large classes of similar projects. Even nationwide general permits are
written by teams of regional staffers (though the teams also include a
leader from the D.C. office), and those teams receive substantial
feedback from other field-office staff. Once the permits are
completed, individual districts can add “regional conditions” to the
nationwide permits. Regional tailoring has become so prevalent that
some regulated entities complain that there is too much of it.
These regionalized permitting processes also authorize
substantial and consequential involvement from states. Section 401
allows states to veto or condition federal “discharge” permits, and
this authority extends to general permits as well. States often use
their section 401 authority to negotiate state-specific changes to
nationwide permits and sometimes have used it to reject nationwide
permits that the state deems insufficiently protective. That legal
leverage, along with the Corps’s desire to expedite regulatory
processes, leads to significant state input. In addition, district offices
also work with some states to develop “state programmatic general
permits.” These are state-specific federal permits, sometimes
managed and issued by state offices, designed to simultaneously
fulfill federal and state permitting requirements.4
Some Implications of Federal Decentralization
This federal decentralization, and productive federal-state
cooperation, upends traditional federalism debates. Current
federalism doctrine proceeds on the premise that federal governance
represents non-local governance. That premise is wrong, at least in
the specific context of the Army Corps. Additionally, regional offices
have important implications for the many spheres in which
regulatory roles overlap and power is shared. In these realms,
regional federal offices play a key—albeit unappreciated—role in
helping a federalist system succeed.

4. See, e.g., Philadelphia Dist., Marine Design Center, State
Programmatic General Permits, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, http://www.
nap.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory/Permits/SPGP.aspx.
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Conventional federalist thought has not explained how officials
from a variety of different federal, state, and local agencies will
actually go about talking through their agreements and differences.
Will they use phone calls, emails, or in-person meetings? If they will
talk face to face, where will they meet, and who will be in the room?
These may sound like mundane questions, but they are crucially
important. Coordination within complex regulatory terrains can
succeed or go very badly, and communication systems help
determine when cooperation thrives, and whether conflicts produce
constructive outcomes or spiral out of control.5
Regional federal offices make that kind of communication
possible. Sometimes they provide a physical space where federalism
can be sorted out, in person, across a conference table—or over a
cubicle wall. Sometimes they provide a base from which federal
officials can reach their meeting locations or field sites with just a
short drive. They also let federal and state regulators get to know
each other, and the resulting familiarity can build trust and social
capital. That won’t always happen, of course, but for many Corps
staff, talking with other state agencies, local governments, and
regional offices from other federal agencies is a daily responsibility.
And the resulting relationships hold professional, and sometimes
personal, value.
Conclusion
Justice Brandeis once referred to the states as “laboratories of
democracy.” That description, though accurate, is underinclusive.
Some of the most effective laboratories may be conference tables
surrounded by staff from local and state governments and federal
regional offices. By making those meetings possible and meaningful,
regional federal offices can serve as the vectors of functional
federalism.

5. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1147–48, 1150–51 (2012).

